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1.0 SUMNARY 
1.1 Purpose 
This Biomedical Ground Lead System is  intended t o  prevent dangerous 
values of e l e c t r i c  current from flowing through an astronatuls  ground electrode, 
while providing a low resis tance path t o  ground f o r  draining static charge, 
and providing e l e c t r i c a l  ground reference f o r  bioinstrumentation. 
1.2 Hardware 
Five breadboard uni t s  and 24 engineering prototype un i t s  were built, 
t es ted  and delivered t o  NASA. One additional engineering prototype unit  Will 
be integrated i n t o  a GFE s t e rna l  harness when wri t ten instruct ions defining 
the  desired configuration have been received from NASA. 
1 - 3  Tests 
Destructive and other t e s t s  were performed on 25 breadboard units 
t o  determine t h e i r  behavior under exceptionally severe e l e c t r i c a l  s t r e s s .  
1.4 Safety and Re l i ab i l i t y  
An analysis was performed resu l t ing  i n  a predicted r e l i a b i l i t y  of 
99.7%. Suggestions are  made f o r  enhancing this r e l i a b i l i t y .  A f a i lu re  mode 
analysis i s  a l so  included. 
?*? Future Requirements 
A method has been proposed f o r  incorporating a uni t  i n  the ground 
electrode of an astronaut 's  s t e rna l  harness. 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Delineation of the Problems t o  be Solved 
There are  several  c i rcmstances r e l a t ing  t o  e l e c t r i c a l  phenomena which 
a re  troublesome t o  astronauts, Among them are: the danger o f  shocks due t o  acci- 
dental 'contact with voltage sources, the discharge of a large s ta t ic  charge which * 
is  often manifested i n  a spark, and the buildup of a la rge  static charge which 
might exceed the  common mode range of bioinstrumentation amplifiers. 
If an astronaut were not touching a conductive par t  of the spacecraft  
frame (ground) with one p a r t  of his body a t  t he  time another p a r t  of h i s  body 
accidentally contacted a voltage source, the danger of heavy shock could be 
minimized by having the  astronaut grounded through a large resistance (exceeding 
20OK ohms). However the buildup of a s t a t i c  charge on the astronaut is  bes t  
accomplished by having his body continually grounded through a low resistance.  
To simultaneously meet both of these conditions, an optimum system would 
provide a low resistance path f o r  small currents t o  prevent the build-up of s t a t i c  
e l ec t r i c i ty ,  and would a l so  l i m i t  any current flow t o  a value well below the 
astronautls perception threshold. 
2.2 Solution t o  these Problems 
Prior' t o  the award of this contract, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company 
(LMSC), had performed a se r i e s  of laboratory experiments with so l id  s t a t e  
e lectronic  c i rcu i t s .  Off-the-shelf f i e l d  e f f ec t  current regulating diodes were 
investigated but  it was found that t h e i r  charac te r i s t ics  did not meet all of the 
requirements. Thereupon, development work was performed t o  employ commercially 
available components in .  a c i r c u i t  which would meet a l l  of the requirements. This 
was successfully accomplished and LMSC b u i l t  several  working models of a satis- 
factory current l imit ing device. T h i s  device w i l l  hereaf ter  be re fer red  t o  as a 
2 
Biomedical. Ground Lead System (BGLS). 
high voltage f i e l d  e f fec t  t r ans i s to r s  (FETs),, two low pinch-off current  'FETs and 
It consis ts  of a c i r c u i t  containing two 
one r e s i s t o r  (See. Figure 
c i rcu i t .  
1). LMSC subsequently applied f o r  a patent on t h i s  
2.3 Operating Specifications 
The BGLS c i r c u i t  operates i n  such a manner t h a t  f o r  low values of applied 
voltage, it acts l i k e  a r e s i s t o r  having a fixed value not exceeding 12,000 o h s .  
However, as the  applied voltage is  increased,. the fixed resis tance no longer 
pertains.  The BGLS instead acts as a device which limits the current t o  0.12 
milliamperes o r  l ess ,  a t  applied voltages up t o  200 vol t s ,  root.mean square (VRMS). 
T h i s  is  considered t o  be a safe current; one which astronauts can withstand with- 
out physiological injury.  A s  a matter of f ac t ,  it is  below the perception.leve1 
of many individuals,  The above mentioned l imit ing values form the bas ic  perfor- 
mace  specif icat ions fo r  the BGLS under this contract, f o r  applied voltagei i n  
the frequency range of zero t o  10,000 Hertz (Hz). 
' 
. 
3.0 FABRICATION 
3.1' ' Breadboard Units 
Each of these units incorporated one,LSL1048-S-b330 r e s i s to r  (3,300 ohms), 
two Amelco 2N 4882 high voltage FETs i n  TO 5 cans and two S i l i c m i x  FN-1598 low 
pinch-off FETs i n  TO 18 cans. An insulat ing sleeve was placed over each of t he  
cans and each c i r c u i t  was soldered by LMSC c e r t i f i e d  solderers, using a f ix ture  
t o  hold the four FETs i n  t h e i r  proper positions. 
Stranded copper lead wires were attached, and the five u n i t s  t o  be 
delivered t o  NASA plus f i v e  of the tes t  units were encapsulated i n  epoxy. The 
s ize  of the encapsulated units i s  approximately 0.5 x 0.5 x 1.75 inches. The 
3 
remaining twenty t e s t  uni ts  were not encapsulated so as t o  f a c i l i t a t e  d i s -  
assembly and post-mortem analyses a f t e r  desctuctive tes t ing  was completed. 
3.2 
The external physical-configuration of these units is  a quarter inch 
square flatpack approximately 0.09inch thick with a gold plated Kovar lead a t  
each end. Internally,  the construction i s  a hybrid microcircuit employing 
0.0007 inch diameter gold wire interconnections ul'crasoni'cdlly bonded t o  the 
components. The 4,700 ohm re s i s to r  i s  a €hick conductive f i lm deposited on a 
ceramic substrate. The junction type s i l i con  FET chips are bonded t o  deposited 
gold fi lm traces  with con&ctive epoxy, 
The two high voltage FET chips i n  each uni t  are gold backed Amelco 
2 N  4882D uni ts  meeting the following requirements: Drain-source "on" resistance 
l e s s  than 3,000 ohms; a t  VDGo of 300 vol ts ,  IDG must be l e s s  than 10 microamperes; 
Par ts  inspected per QAI 4-4 t o  assure high r e l i a b i l i t y .  
. .  
The two low pinch-off FET chips i n  each uni t  are  gold backed Siliconix 
FN 1767 un i t s  subjected t o  100% visua l  examination per PS 4003 Appendix A 
t o  obtain high r e l i ab i l i t y .  
A s e r i a l  number was inscreibed on each flatpack, and a f t e r  the  c i r cu i t s  
were completed, they were operated t o  check function. T h i s  was followed by a 
formal 100% pre-seal visual  inspection by LMSC and US A i r  Force inspectors 
(since NASA had delegated this function t o  Air Force Quality Assurance personnel 
a t  Sunn@ale). The covers were then sealed onto the f la t  packs using epog ,  
and the uni ts  were again functionally checked. Next a l*burn in"  operation 
was pbrforned, subjecting each uni t  t o  175 VRMS a t  60 Ha continuously for 65 
hours. After this a formal functional t e s t  was performed i n  the presence of 
one LMSC and one US A i r  Force inspector. All of the contractually required 
functional parayeters were measured and recorded along with the s e r i a l  number 
of each unit, and the datasheets were sent' t o  NASA with the units.  
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3.3 Additional Work 
I n  addition t o  the 24 unembellished engineering prototype units,  one BGLS 
I 
un i t  w i l l  be integrated i n t o  the  W E  s t e rna l  harness when wri t ten instruct ions 
defining the desired configuration have been received from” NASA. 
4.0 SDETY AND RELIABILITY 
4.1 Rel iab i l i ty  Prediction 
Figure 1 is  a schematic diagram of the BGLS c i r cu i t .  Figure 2 i s  the 
‘- 
r e l i a b i l i t y  model used i n  making the  r e l i a b i l i t y  prediction. 
The available s ta t is t ical  f a i l u r e  r a t e  data f o r  microelectronic hybrid 
c i r c u i t  devices i s  based on the  first generation of hybrid c i r c u i t  devices. The 
rapid advances i n  the  state-of-the-art  of microelectronic hybrid c i r c u i t  devices 
and t h e i r  increasing use and high inherent r e l i a b i l i t y  would indicate  t h a t  when 
s t a t i s t i c a l  f a i l u r e  r a t e  data become available f o r  the present generation of 
hybrid c i r c u i t  devices, they should exhibi t  lower f a i lu re  s a t e s  than those u t i l i zed  
i n  the computation of ‘this r e l i a b i l i t y  prediction. 
.BGLS RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
k of FET die 
A b  = .0018, 3- E = 10.0, ITA d z E  = 0,005 
= .Okl$ / lOOOHrs  = S Solving : 
Source: RADC Rel iab i l i ty  Notebook Volume I1 
A of thick fi lm re s i s to r  h R  = .01$ /lo00 ltlrs or  = .1 x 
R 
(Random failure r a t e  B normal ra ted power Q 60°C is .Ol$ t o  .Ok$/lOOO Hrs per M i l -  
HD3K 217A) 
of ultrasonic bonded wire jo in t s  .001$/1000Hrs (EST.) 18 jo in ts  x -01 x = 
-18 x =A .~18 
FIGURE 1 
S C H W T I C  D I A G W  OF BGLS CIRCUIT 
( Patent Appiie6 For ) 
Q , and Q + are h igh  vol tage FET sa 
and &. .'are low pinch-,off FET s e  Q Z  3 
Rl3LZABILITY MODEL OF BGLS 
b 
RBGLS = Rel iab i l i ty  of BGLS 
. A = Failure Rate 
t I = Mission Time i n  Hours = 13u 
-ht N 
%GLS= e = I - A t  
RSGLs 1 ., (RQ1 + R + R + RQ+ + % + R j  )( t )  x lo-6 
Q2 Q3 18 
-6 . .41 + .1 + .18) (1344) x 10 
The lower values of f a i lu re  r a t e s  were used t o  p a r t i a l l y  compensate f o r  the 
0 passive, normally unpowered, operation of the BGLS and the 7OoF (21.1 C) 
temperature anticipated f o r  the astronaut and the BGLS. Most f a i lu re  r a t e s  are 
based on normal rated power at  6OoC (14OOF) temperature levels.  
The above analyt ical  study predicts  a r e l i a b i l i t y  of 99.742%. However, a 
r e l i a b i l i t y  of 95% t o  a confidence l e v e l  of 70% is demonstrated by tes t ing  an 
en t i re  l o t  of 25 BGLS t o  the f u l l  rated voltage without any fai lures .  * 
4.2 Medical Safety Considerations 
A major purpose of the BGLS i s  t o  prevent the buildup of large e lec t ros ta t ic  
potent ia ls  between the astronaut and h i s  immediate environment. An e lec t ros ta t ic  
discharge c0nst i tutes .a  shock hazard, which if it occurs a t  a c r i t i c a l  time in 
f l igh t ,  may ser iously endanger the mission. Such discharges frequently cause 
sparks which a re  especially hazardous i n  an oxygen atmosphere. The buildup' of 
large e lec t ros ta t ic  charges can also in te r fe re  with the proper funCtioning of ,  
o r  may even damage, biomedicalmonitoring equipment. Use of the BGLS can prevejh 
ordinary e l ec t r i ca l  shock and accidental elecizocution i n  the event t h a t  the 
astronaut touches a tfhotl* AC o r  DC source, the other side of  which i s  grounded 
t o  the space vehicle. 
By v i r tue  of the unique e l e c t r i c a l  character is t ics  of the BGLS, any 
*Using data tabulated i n  NOTs Tech. Memo 113. 
e lec t ros t a t i c  charge being generated w i l l  be drained off 
the touching of a %oti1 e l e c t r i c a l  source w i l l  r e su l t  i n  
sensible, and en t i re ly  harmless current flow through the 
I 
instantaneously, while 
only a m i n i m a l ,  in-  
astronaut 's body, 
provided t h a t  the voltage l e v e l  of this source is below the peak'operating 
voltage r a t ing  of the BGLS. 
It m u s t  be remenbered, however, that  the BGLS can only protect the 
astronaut against ordinary e l e c t r i c a l  shock i f  the astronaut i s  not in -  
advertently a l so  grounded t o  his spacecraft by other 'low resistance ground 
return paths. Such accidental  ground paths can conceivably be established 
through biomonitoring leads due t o  the accumulation of perspiration on the 
lead connectors of body-worn s ignal  conditioners, or even by the condensation 
of water vapor, mixed with par t iculate  deposits, on the inside of the  exhaust 
hose when the astronaut i s  dressed i n  a fu l l  pressure suit with the visor of * 
his helmet closed. 
The l a t t e r  poss ib i l i ty  could be prevented by the use of a heating 
element b u i l t  i n t o  the w a l l  of the proximal section of the exhaust tube. 
Accidental grounding through the biomedical leads can be readi ly  eliminated 
by in s t a l l i ng  BGLS devices 'at  the proximal and distal ends of all active bio- 
medical monitoring leads as well as at the distal ends of all ( inact ive)  
shields surrounding these leads a t  the point where they i b e r f a c e  with space- 
c r a f t  equipment. 
For the  sake of providing the  astronauts with optimum protection, LMSC 
recommends t h a t  both of the above suggestions be given serious consideration 
for  future implementation. The poss ib i l i t y  of establishing accidental ground 
return' paths by condensed water vapor on the microphone, earphones, sensor 
f o r  p a r t i a l  pressure of carbon dioxide i n  the suit,and other transducers 
should also be evaluated. 
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4.3 Failure Modes and Effects  Analysis 
A summary of fa i lure  modes and resul tant  shock currents are  l i s t e d  below. 
The component designations r e l a t e  t o  the c i r c u i t  diagram of Figure 1. Since 
the c i r cu i t  i s  bi-directionally symmetrical, fa i lure  modes f o r  Q1 and Q2 a lso  
apply f o r  Q and Q respectively. 4. 3’ 
is the zero gate voltage small signdl drain t o  source resistance dssl 
of Q,. (approximately 2,000 ohms) 
r dss2 i s  the  zero gate voltage s m a l l  s ignal drain t o  source resistance 
o f  Q2 (approximately 1,000 ohms). 
4.3.1 Q1 drain open c i r c u i t  
I = 0 f o r  both directions 
4.3.2 Q gate open c i r cu i t  1 
4.3.2.1 For A positive: 
This i s  a shock mode. The current i s  l imited by the open gate current 
l imit ing value of Q, which approximates the Idss value. For the 
2N4882 FETs used i n  the breadboard EGLS, this current i s  between 
1.5 ma,  and 7 * 5  ma.’ f o r  voltages through about 280 vol t s .  
4.3.2.2 For B posit ive 
Normal operation 
4.3.3 Q~ source open c i r cu i t  
4.3.3.1 For A posi t ive 
This is  not a shock mode:’, The current i s  limited t o  the reverse 
biased current flowing across the gate-to-drain junction of Q, 
This current w i l l  not exceed 10 a through about 280 vol ts .  p” 
4.3.3.2 For B posit ive,  t he  l imit ing action w i l l  be normal, bu t  i n  the 
operating mode, b ioe l ec t r i ca l  s ignals  w i l l  be blocked, since the bio- 
e l e c t r i c a l  voltages are  not large enough t o  forward b i a s  the  drain- 
to-gate junction of Q 1' 
4.3*4 Q, drain-to-gate short  
4,3.4.1 For A posit ive,  this i s  a shock mode. The current w i l l  conform' t o  
the following equation: 
E 
I = R + r dssl  + r dss2 + Rexternal 
Assuming an external  resistance (electrode connections and pat ient  
body resis tance)  of 1OOO.L , the  current ' w i l l  be approximately 
I = 0.12 E 
where I is current i n  milliamperes 
E 5s applied voltage i n  v o l t s  
4.3.4.2 For B posi t ive 
Normal Operation 
4.3.5 Q1 source-to-gate short 
4.3.5.1 For A posit ive,  this i s  a shock mode. The current is  l imited by the 
value of Qle For t h e  2 N  4882 FETs used i n  the  breadboard BGLS, Idss 
this current i s  between 1.5 ma. and 7.5 ma. through about 280 vol ts .  
4.3.5.2 For B posi t ive 
Normal operation 
.. -- 
4.3.6 Q1 drain-to-source short  
4.3.6.1 For A positive, t h i s  is a shock mode. Operation w i l l  be noma1 f o r  
applied voltages below the drain-to-gate breakdown voltage of Q, , 
approximately 70 vo l t s  f o r  the FN 1598 FETS used i n  the BGLS bread- 
board. 
For voltages ,exceeding the Q2 breakdown-voltage and currents l o w  
low enough t h a t  Q2 is  not damaged, the current w i l l  conform t o  the 
following equation: 
E -EB2 
R + r dssl + r dss2  + Rexternal I = I L +  
Where I is  the normal l imiting current. L 
Ass'Lrming an external resistance of 1,000 ohms, the current i s  
approximately : 
I = 0.1 + 0.12 (E-70) 
Where: I = current i n  milliamperes 
E = applied voltage i n  vo l t s  
The long term current which w i l l  damage Q2 corresponds t o  about 300 mw, 
o r  f o r  a breakdown of 70 vol ts ,  I =- 
This current will flow a t  a voltage of approximately 105 volts.  
Significantly higher t ransient ,  impulse, or AC voltages can be 
applied without damaging Q2*. The ef fec t  of a Q2 fa i lure  i n  
.3w - 4.3 ma 70V 
conjunction with a Q 
f a i lu re  mode. These w i l l  be t reated under Vombined Failure 
ModesIf, sections 4.3.17 and up. 
drain-to-source short  depends on the  Q2 1 
.. - 
4.3.6.2 For B posit ive 
Normal operation 
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4.3 0 7 
4.3.8 
4.3.8.1 
I 
4.3.10 
Q, drain open c i r c u i t  
This is not a shock mode. The e f fec t  is the same as f o r  a Q1 
source open c i r cu i t  (See section 4.3.3) 
Q2 qate open c i r cu i t  
For A positive, t h i s  i s  a shock mode+. The current is  l imited by the 
open gate current l imiting value of Q, which approixmates the Idss  
value. For the FN 1598 FETs used i n  the breadboard BGLS, this 
current i s  between 0.2 and 0.6 ma. 
For B posit ive 
Normal operation 
Q2 source open c i r cu i t .  
T h i s  i s  not a shock mode. The e f fec t  i s  the same as Q, drain open 
c i r c u i t  (See section 4.3.7 and section 4-3.3) 
Q source-to-gate short c i r cu i t  2 
4.3,lO.l For A positive, t h i s  i s  a shock mode. The current is  limited by the 
I d s s  value of Q2. For the FN 1598 FETs used i n  the BGLS breadboard, 
this current i s  between 0.2 and 0;6 ma. 
4.3.10.2 For B positive, the  current i s  limited by the I d s s  value of Q 3’ 
which is  also 0.2 t o  0.6 ma .  
4.3.11 Q2 drain-to-gate short, this is  a shock mode, 
* Note: 0.2 m a  cannot be detected by the average person i n  normal electrode 
locations.. 0.6 m a  can be eas i ly  sensed but has a low probabi l i ty  of d i rec t  
harm. 
4.3.11.1 For A positive, the current i s  limited by the I d s s  of Q, which 
i s  between 1.5 ma and 7.5 ma. 
4.3.11.2 For E positive, the current is limited by the I d s s  of Q which 3' 
i s  between 0.2 ma and 0.6 ma 
Q 
same as f o r  a Q 
drain-to-source short. This'is a shock mode. The e f f ec t  i s  the 2 
source-to-gate short  (See section 4.3.5) 1 
Q1 soWce-to-gate-to-drain short. T h i s  i s  a shock mode. The effect  
i s  the same as f o r  a Q1 drain-to-gate short  (See section 4.3.4) 
Q source-to-gate-to-drain short. This i s  a shock mode. The e f f ec t  
i s  the same as f o r  a Q2 drain-to-gate short (See section 4.3.11) 
2 
R open c i r cu i t .  This is  not a shock mode. The current i s  equal t o  the, 
sum of the reverse biased gate-to-drain junction currents of Q1 and 
Q2. This current should not exceed 10 a f o r  a 280 v o l t  applied voltage. /" 
R short  c i r cu i t ,  This i s  a shock'mode, The e f fec t  i s  the same as a 
Q2 source-to-gate short  (See section 4.3 .lo). 
Combined Failure Modes 
I n  case of a Q drain-to-source short, a normally protected voltage . 1  
can damage Q2. The following are the e f fec ts  of various Q2 f a i lu re  modes i n  
conjunction with a Q drain-to-source short. 1 
4.3.17 Q2 drain open (and Q, drain-to-source short) .  This i s  not a shock 
mode. The e f f ec t  i s  the same as f o r  a single f a i lu re  Q, source 
open c i r c u i t  (See section 4.3.3). 
4.3.18 Q2 source open (and Q 
mode. 
drain-to-source short) .  This i s  a shock 1 
4.3.18.1 For A positive. 
For voltages below the Q2 drain-to-gate breakdown voltage the e f f ec t  
is the same as f o r  a single fa i lure  Q2 source open (See section 4.3.9) 
For voltages above the Q, drain-to-gate breakdown voltage, the 
current i s  the same as f o r  the ' s ing le  f a i lu re  Q1 drain-to-source 
short  (See section 4.3*6). 
4.3.18.2 For B posit ive 
The ef fec t  i s  the same as f o r  the single f a i l u r e  Q, source open 
(See section 4*3.9). 
4.3.19 Q2 gate open (and Q, drain-to-source short) .  this is  a shock mode. 
4.3.19.1 For A positive. 
For voltages below the Q drain-to-source breakdown voltage, the 
e f fec t  i s  the same as f o r  the  single fa i lure  Q2 gate open (see 
section 4.3.8). 
For voltages above the Q2 drain-to-source breakdown voltage, the 
current could increase u n t i l  a fur ther  f a i lu re  occurs, probably an 
open. 
2 
4.3.19.2 For B posit ive,  
The e f fec t  is  the same as f o r  the single f a i lu re  Q2 gate open (see 
Section 4.3.8). 
h.3.20 R open (and Q drain-to-source short)  1 
4.3.20.1 For A posit ive 
T h i s  i s  a shock mode. The e f fec t  i s  the same as f o r  the  combined 
f a i l u r e s  of Q1 drain-to-source short  and Q2 source open (See 
section 4.3 -18). 
4.3.20.2 For B posit ive.  
The e f f e c t  i s  essent ia l ly  the  same as for a single mode f a i l u r e  R 
open (see sect ion 4.3.15) 
4.3.21 R shor t  and Q1 drain-to-source short .  
T h i s  i s  a shock mode. 
4.3.?1.1 For A posit ive 
For voltages below the Q2 drain-to-gate breakdown voltage, t h e  effect  
i s  essent ia l ly  the same as f o r  a s ingle  f a i l u r e  R shor t  (See section ' 
4.3.16). For voltages greater than the Q2 drain-to-gate breakdown 
voltage, the  current could increase u n t i l  a fur ther  f a i l u r e  occurs, 
probably an open. 
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4.3.21.2 For B posi t ive 
T h i s  is  a shock mode. The e f f ec t  i s  essent ia l ly  the  same as fo r  a 
s ingle  failure R short  (see section 4.3.16) 
4.3.22 
4.3.23 
Q2 drain-to-source shor t  (and Q 
shock mode. The e f fec t  i s  the  same as f o r  a single f a i l u r e  Q1 
drain-to-gate shor t  (see sec t ion  ke3 .4) 
drain-to-source short) .  T h i s  i s  a 1 
Q2 drain-to-gate short  (and Q, drain-to-source short) .  T h i s  i s  a 
shock mode. 
4.3.23.1 For A posi t ive 
The current can increase u n t i l  a fur ther  f a i lu re  occurs. 
4.3.23.2 For B posit ive 
The e f f ec t  i s  essent ia l ly  the  same as f o r  a single f a i lu re  R 
short  (see sect ion 4.3,21) 
4.3.24 
4.3825 
I 
L'j. 27 
4.3.28 
Q1 drain t o  source short  and Q? source-to-gate short. T h i s  i s  a 
shock mode. The e f fec t  i s  the same as f o r  Q1 drain-to-source shor t  
and R short  (See sect ion 4,3.29). 
Q 
e f f e c t  i s  essent ia l ly  the same as f o r  a single f a i l u r e  Q1 drain 
to-gate short  (see section 4.3.4) 
drain-to-gate short  and;Q2 drain open. T h i s  is  a shock mode. The 1 
:Q source open. 2 
T h i s  i s  a shock mode. The e f f ec t  is essent ia l ly  the same as f o r  a 
s ingle  f a i lu re  Q drain-to-gate short  (see sect ion 4.3.4) 1 
:Q, gate open. This i s  a shock mode. The e f f ec t  i s  essent ia l ly  the 
same as f o r  a s ingle  f a i l u r e  Q1 drain-to-gate short  (see sect ion 4.3.4) * 
:Q1 drain t o  gate shor t  and R open 
4.3.28.1 For A posit ive 
T h i s  i s  a shock mode. The e f f ec t  i s  the  same as f o r  the s iogle  f a i lu re  
Q1 drain t o  gate short  except tha t  f o r  voltages below the forward 
conduction voltage of the  Q 
0 . 6 ~ )  the current i s  reduced (see sect ion 4.3.4) 
gate-to-drain junction (approximately 3 
4.3.28.2 For 3 posit ive 
The ef fec t  i s  the  same as f o r  a single f a i l u r e  R open 
(See section 4.3.15). 
4.3.29 :R short .  This is a shock mode. The e f f ec t  i s  the same as f o r  a 
. combined Q drain-to-source short  and a Q drain-to-gate short. 1 2 
(See sect ion 4.3.23). 
4.3.30 Q d r a i n . t o  gate short and:Q2 drain t o  source short .  This has the 
I- 1 
same e f f ec t  as a single f a i l u r e  Q1 drain-to-gate short  (see 
sect ion 4.3.4) 
4.3.31 :Q2 drain-to-gate short .  This has the sane e f f ec t  as a single f a i lu re  
Q drain-to-gate short .  (see section b.3*4) 1 
4.3.32 :Q2 source-to-gate short .  This has the same e f fec t  as a combined Ql 
drain-to-source short  and a Q2 drain-to-gate short  (see section 4.3.23) 
Failure Analysis Summary 
Sect ion 
4.3.1 
4.302 
4.3.3 
4*3 *4 
4.3.5 
4.3.6 
4.3.7 
/Iode 
Q drain open 1 
Q gate open 1 
Q1 source open 
Q1 drain-to-gate short  
Q1 source t o  gate short  
Q drain t o  source short  1 
Q2 .drain open 
4.3.8 
4.3.9 
4.3.10 
4.3..11 
4.3.12 
4.3 -13 
4.3.14 
4.3.lf; 
4.3.16 
4.3.17 
4,3.18 
4.3.19 
b.3.20 
4.3.21 
4.3.22 
4.3.23 
4.3.24 
4.3.25 
4.3.26 
4.3.27 
4.3.28 
Q gate open 
Q2 source open 
Q source-to-gate short  
Q, drain-to-gate short  
2 
2 
Q2 drain-to-source short  
Q source-to-gate-to-drain short  1 
Q2 source-to-gate-to-drain short  
R open 
R short  
Q1 drain-to-source short  a.nd:Q2 drain open 
, Q 2  source open 
: Q  gate open 2 
: R  open 
: R . .  short  
~ Q2 drain-to-source short  
: Q2 drain-to-gate short  
:Q2 source-to-gate short  
Q drain-to-gate short  and:Q2 drain open 1 
2 
2 
:Q source open 
:Q gate open 
:a open 
4.3.29 R short  I 
4.3*30 
4.3.31 
4.3.32 
Q2 drain-to-source short  
Q2 drain-to-gate short  
Q2 source-to-gate short, 
4.4 (also,  see section 4.2) 
Analysis indicates  t ha t  the BGLS w i l l  protect  an astronaut from 
unexpected electroshock hazard with a predicted r e l i a b i l i t y  of .997. In- 
corporation of a second BGLS i n  s e r i e s  with the first w i l l  increase the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  t o  ,999993, with respect t o  protecting the astronaut from l e t h a l  
amounts of current. The resis tance of two BGLS i n  ser ies ,  however, would be 
twice as great.  
The adoption of periodic checkout procedures w i l l  s ign i f icant ly  reduce 
the poss ib i l i ty  of a BGLS remaining i n  service a f t e r  a fa i lure ,  has occurred.. 
Because the  BGLS can be damaged by high voltages even though the 
t o t a l  e l e c t r i c a l  energy applied i s  small, precautions m u s t  be taken t o  avoid 
exposure t o  s ta t ic  e l e c t r i c i t y  discharge pr ior  t o  o r  during attachment of the 
BGLS t o  the  astronaut via the  grounding electrode. For a fu r the r  discussion 
of this, see sect ion 5. 
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5.0 
5.1 
DESTRUCTIVE AND OTHER TESTS ON WTY-FNE BREADBOARD UNITS 
Overload Test Procedures 
Overload tests t o  f a i l u r e  were conducted using fou r  loading con- . -  
di t ions  as follows: 
5 S . l  AC Gradual. Voltage Increase Tests, A 60 Hz ad voltage was'applied 
across the BGLS unit and the voltage was gradually increased u n t i l  
the  unit fa i led .  T h i s  test was a l s o  conducted f o r  pa i r s  of EGLS 
units connected i n  ser ies .  
5.1.2 . AC Step Increment Tests. 60 Hz ac voltage was i n i t i a l l y  s e t  t o  
230 v RMS and then switchedacross the  BGLS wlit. The BGLS 
unit Qas then switched out of the  c i r cu i t ,  the voltage was 
increased by 10 vol ts ,  and the  BGLS unit was again switched 
in to  the  c i r cu i t .  T h i s  process of increasing the t e s t  voltage 
was continued unt iZ, the BGLS unit fa i led ,  
Dc Gradual Increase Tests. A de voltage was applied across the  5.103 
BGLS un i t  and the  voltage was gradually increased u n t i l  the  
uni t  f a i l ed ,  
I 
5-1.4 Energy Pulse Tests. A 15 pf capacitor was charged t o  1,000 volts 
and discharged across the  BGLS unit .  An18 pf capacitor was 
charged t o  1,000 vo l t s  and discharged across the BGLS unit. 
T h i s  procedure was continued with capacitance values increasing 
by about 23% f o r  each s t ep  u n t i l  the  unit  fa i led .  
Extended Duration Tests,, A 230 VRMS 60 Ha voltage was applied 
I -  
5.105 
across the  BGLS units under tes t  f o r  four days. T h i s  i s  not 
an  overload test, but a maximum operating load t e s t .  
5.1.6 Simulated Failure Tests. These t e s t swere  used t o  deternine 
the e f fec ts  of various f a i l u r e  modes on the device function. 
Components were shorted and/or open circui ted and the resul t ing 
device character is t ics  were measured. 
5.2 Bsults 
The primary r e su l t s  of these. BGLS breadboard t e s t s  can be summarized 
as follows: 
5.2.1 
5.2.2 
592.3 
5.2.4 
5.2.5 
No Failures occurred within the contractual requirement envelope, 
(See 5.2.7) 
There were no s ignif icant  differences i n  f a i l u r e  mode o r  i n  
the overload l eve l  required f o r  f a i l u r e  between units which were 
subjected t o  a gradual increase of applied voltage and those which 
were subjected t o  incrementally increasing values of applied 
voltage. 
The mximm applied voltage i n i t i a t e s  the fa i lure ,  L e . ,  the 
peak voltage of the ac signal resul t ing i n  f a i l u r e  approximates 
the dc voltage resul t ing i n  fa i lure .  
The f a i lu re  caused by overload voltage l eve l s  resu l t  i n  open 
c i r c u i t  f a i l e d  units. However, the indications a re  than the in i t ia l  
f a i l u r e  i s  a reduced voltage breakdown resul t ing i n  an excessive 
current pulse which causes a !lfuseff type open c i rcu i t .  
There is one type.of damage which can cause functional destruction 
of the BGLS pr ior  t o  i ts ultimate use; this is  by applying an energy 
pulse overload. T h i s  f a i l u r e  mechanism can be caused by a s t a t i c  
charge built up t o  a re la t ive ly  high voltage (thousands of vo l t s )  
and inadvertently discharged d i rec t ly  through the BGLS unit. 
Tests conducted with a 1,000 vol t  source and capacitors i n  
graduated s izes  indicate that re la t ive ly  low energy pulse leve ls  
can degrade the high voltage protection l eve l  of  the BGLS unit. 
For example, a 68 pf capacitor charged t o  1,000 vol t s  and 
discharged through BGLS breadboard unit  # 08 resulted i n ’ a  break 
down voltage reduction from greater  than 300 vol ts  t o  l e s s  than 
10 vol ts ,  
To prevent the  damaging of BGLS i n  this manner, it i s  recommended 
tha t  precautions be taken t o  avoid exposure t o  s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  
discharge pr ior  t o  o r  during application of the BGLS t o  the 
astronaut. 
5.2.6 No f a i lu re s  resulted from extended duration t e s t s  ( f o u r  days) a t  
a 0  v RMS, 60 Hz f o r  fou r  units (# 6, 7, 12, 13)0 
5.2.7 Tabulation of Results 
Breadboard 
Serial  Noe 3hi.lm-e Overload 
BGL S 
Failure Mode 
16 
17 
18 
22 - 23 ( i n  ser ies )  
21, - 25 ( i n  ser ies )  
19 
20 
2L 
8 (Encapsulated) 
10 (Encapsulated) 
14 
15 
24.0 v RMS 60 Hz (Gradual) 
24.3 v RMS 60 Hz 
24r, v RMS 60 Hz 
500 v RMS 60 Hz (Gradual) 
4?8 v RMS 60 Hz (Gradual) 
260 v RMS 60 Hz (1Ov Steps) 
260 v RMS 60 HZ 
250 v RMS 60 Hz 
68 pf a t  1000 v 
37 pf a t 1 0 0 0  v 
100 pf a t  1000 v 
Z O  pf a t  1000 v 
Open* 
Open’ 
Open 
Open 
Open 
Open 
Open 
Open 
Reduced breakdown voltage 1( 
Reduced breakdown voltage 3’ 
Reduced breakdown voltage 1( 
Reduced breakdown voltage 1. 
Extended Duration Test 
6 230 v 60 Hz f o r  f o u r  days No f a i l u r e  
7 200 ‘v 60 HZ f o r  four  days No f a i l u r e  
1 2  200 v 60 Hz f o r  f o u r  days No f a i l u r e  
13 21)O v 60 HZ f o r  f o u r  days No f a i l u r e  
Extended Duration Test Continued 
Breadboard 
Serial  No. 
BGLS 
Failure Overload 
11 
26 
27 
2% 
29 
30 
31 
Simulated Failure Tests 
Simulated Failure Tests 
Simulated Failure Tests 
Simulated Failure Tests 
Simulated Failure Tests 
Simulated Failure Tests 
Simulated Failure Tests 
*Mysis  of the f a i l e d  components indicates an i n i t i a l  short o r  reduced 
breakdown fa i lu re ,  followed immediately by a ltfuse" type open c i rcu i t .  
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 ' A method of protecting the BGLS f rom s t a t i c  discharge f a i lu re s  
should be employed. Essentially,. this consists o f  grounding 
(o r  insulating) equipment and personnel handling the BGLS. 
,* 
5.3.2 A simple go-no go test u n i t  should be developed f o r  routine . 
use i n  checking BGLS units u n t i l  more operating experience has 
been accumulated. 
6.0 FUTURE RXQUIREMENTS 
If NASA deems the BGLS Engineering Prototype configuration t o  be 
small enough, it could be used f o r  the f l i g h t  version i n  a manned i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  Figure 6 . T h i s  shows a ground electrode having a rectangular recessed 
area 
t h i s  
skin 
on the side away from the skin. The BGLS could be encapsulated in to  
recessed area, and one lead would be routed t o  the electrolyte  on the 
s ide while the other lead would be greater  than a normal ground electrode 
unless the depth of the electrolyte  paste depression could be reduced. 
If fur ther  miniaturization i s  required, LMSC recommends that a 
special  f la tpack could be made t o  our  specifications, t o  reduce the one 
quarter inch width. 
FIG. 6 
1 9  
BGLS 
BGLS INTEGRATED.INT0 GROUND ELECTRODE 
To enable handling personnel t o  check BGLS units t o  ver i fy  that 
they a re  i n  good operating condition, a simple 1tgo or no got1 test unit 
shoul'd be developed. 
As mentioned i n  Section 5.0, the BcrLS can be incapacitated by 
discharge of very high voltages through the unit prior t o  or during appli- 
cation t o  the astronaut. Although the probabili ty of this occurrence i s  
small, it may be desirable to investigate the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of  adding 
components t o  the internal. BGLS c i r c u i t  t o  make it invulnerable t o  this 
type of damage. 
,* 
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